價值投資, 投資負債資產比（負債/資產） 小於0.5 的公司

價值投資, 投資負債資產比（負債/資產） 小於0.5 的公司

以下為 台積電ADR 的負債／資產比

Liquidity/Financial Health	2012-12	2013-12	2014-12	2015-12	2016-12	Latest Qtr
Debt/Equity	—	0.25	0.21	0.16	0.11	0.06

優秀企業的經濟基本面通常極佳，就算碰到問題，也有足夠的資金可以東山再起；平庸的企業就沒有這樣的本事，由於經濟基本面不佳，就算管理再厲害都救不起來。

卓越的企業通常具備充裕的現金，沒有什麼債務，就算碰到問題或經濟走下坡，都有足夠的本錢可以脫困。但平庸的企業則經常是債務纏身，缺乏現金週轉，一旦碰到困境，只能挖東牆補西牆，結果衍生更多的問題。這種公司就算經營得再有聲有色，疲弱的經濟終究會拖垮公司的績效。

熱爐規則(Hotstove rule)

熱爐規則(Hotstove rule)

“Hotstove rule” 是一套被頻繁引用的規則;它能指導管理者,有效地訓練員工;這一項規則是因為觸摸熱爐有著許多相似的地方而被稱為” 熱爐規則”

” 熱爐規則”闡述了組織中有效的懲處原則,那就是:

(1)   警告性原則:熱爐火紅,不用手去摸也知道爐子是的,是會灼傷人的. 管理者要經常地對部屬進行規則制度教育,藉以警告他們的不要觸犯規章制度,否則就會受到懲處.

(2)   必然性原則:每當你碰到熱爐,肯定是會被灼傷的; 這也就是說,只要觸犯到規章制度,就一定會受到懲處的.

(3)   即時性原則:當你碰到熱爐時,立即會被灼傷. 懲處必須在錯誤行為發生後立即進行,絕不可拖泥帶水,絕不可有時間差,以便達到及時改正錯誤行為的目的.

(4)   公平性原則:不管誰碰到熱爐,都會被灼傷的.

安全邊際(Margin of Safety)

安全邊際(Margin of Safety)

巴菲特在”1990年寫給股東的信”中說:

面對把正確投資的秘密濃縮為三個單詞的挑戰,我斗膽地提出座右銘: 安全邊際. 我讀過這句話已經四十二年了,至今我仍然認為安全邊際非常正確.投資人忽視了這個非常簡單的投資座右銘,從而導致他們從1990年代開始遭到重大的損失.

巴菲特+菲爾.湯恩+海格斯壯

以下投資大師的投資金律, 有異曲同工之妙
巴菲特：
第一條：不要賠錢；第二條：不要忘記第一條。

菲爾.湯恩：認為巴菲特的投資金律是從４個Ｍ開始：意義，護城河，管理團隊和安全利潤
意義：這家企業對你有意義嗎？
護城河：這家企業有寛廣的護城河嗎？
管理團隊：這家企業有優秀的管理團隊嗎？
安全利潤：這家企業有很大的安全利潤空間嗎？

海格斯壯(Rorber G Hagsrom)把巴菲特的投資金律，列出更細的準則。
專業守則：
(1)這項事業是否簡單易懂？
(2)這項事業是否有一貫的營運記錄？
(3)這項事業長期遠景是否看好？
管理團隊守則
(1)管理團隊是否夠理性?
(2)管理團隊是否坦白對待股東?
(3)管理團隊能否獨排眾議?
財務守則
(1)股東權益報酬是多少?
(2)公司的保留餘為何?
(3)獲利率是多少?
(4)每保留1美元,能否至少創造1美元的市場價值?
價值守則
(1)這家公司價值為何?
(2)能否以相當便宜的折扣價格買到它?

均衡人生5個球，Brain Dyson

前可口可樂子公司總裁布萊恩.戴森（Brain Dyson)，1996年在喬治亞理工學院的畢業典禮上致詞時說，想像人生是一場在天空不停抛接５個球的遊戲，這5個球分別是：
工作
家庭
健康
朋友
心靈
而你不能讓任何一個球落地。你很快會發現，工作是一個橡皮球，如果它掉下來，會彈回去，而其他４個球是玻璃做的，如果失手，就會出現無法挽回的刻痕，損壞，其至破碎，將不再和以前一樣。

黑天鵝效應, Nassim Nicholas Taleb

黑天鵝具備了三個特質：
(1難以預測的驚訝，正常的歷史，科學，財務和科技，都難預測到。
(2)帶來相當大的衝擊。
(3)一旦發之後，彷彿有有一定的蛛絲馬跡可以被預測。

10個讓法人戒慎恐懼的跡象

10個讓法人戒慎恐懼的跡象

(1)   缺乏誠信的CEO

(2)   頻更換會計師與事務所

(3)   董監事質設比率高或持股偏低

(4)   財務長無預警離職

(5)   旗下擁有眾多子公司

(6)   可轉換公司債價格低於票面

(7)   過度膨脹產業前景

(8)   股價異常變化

(9)   營收有虛增業績的情況

(10)   公司有現金償債能力不足或有關係人掏空資產的疑慮

股權結構設計，決定創業成敗

創業家就算有再宏偉的理想，如果沒有好的股權設計，新創公司其實是建立在流沙上的房子，既蓋不高，還隨時有傾頽的危險。

創業家應對股權要有次序地陸續釋放，保有新的策略性股東加入的餘地，

應以合理的股價提供給策略性股東，而非想著利用增資來提高浮誇的估值，這才是新創公司可長可久的奠基工程。

弗萊明斯(J. Flemmings)

如果你勝利了，生命會向你敞開大門。

你在走向勝利的路上，會經常看到地獄；這就是生命。

但如果你堅決相信你的夢想，它就不會讓你跌倒。

並給你想要的一切，而且還比你所要的多得多。

多種收入來源

創造出第二個支撐點,為你自己開發出更多的收入來源，如果你計劃賺一份額外收入，這裡有一些重要的建議：

(1)   開發第二個收入來源：如果你的額外入和主要收入來自同一個來源，這就不是真正的第二支撐點。

(2)   尋找一份你可以學到新知識，有挑戰性，並讓你成長的職業。

(3)   學會銷售：自己，服務,點子，產品，知識，資訊等等。

(4)   敢冒風險：不要對犯錯有任何的恐懼：即使你的額外收入出現問題，你也不會有生存的危機。你的主要職業己為你織好了一張網，這是一個訓練你風險承受力絕佳機會。

(5)   不要以你的工作時間來計算收入，等著其他有多次報酬及抽取佣金的機會，創造你可以出售的東西。

(6)   嘗試找一份讓你從中得到樂趣，並和你的能力相符的職業，問問自己：我如何利用我的嗜好賺錢？

(7)   不斷思考，如何訓練自己成為專家，我相信，許多人本身就是好書的素材。

(8)   你無論如何應額外成為投資者，創造自己的金錢機器。

股票買前與買後的心態

有句話說的好，只有買入以後才能全面瞭解一支股票。這句話很對。買入之前是以旁觀者的身份看股票，不會太上心。買入之後就不一樣了，原來沒發現的缺點都看的更清楚了。當然了，持有一段時間後，也會發現開始沒看出來的機會。

投資不是賭博

如果你在股市不斷進出，只求幾個價位的利潤，或是不斷拋空，進行期權或期貨交易，股市對你來說已成了賭場，而你就像賭徒，最終會血本無歸。

黑天鵝與灰犀牛

黑天鵝與灰犀牛

不同於黑天鵝的無法預知,難以預見,灰犀牛是顯而易見,存在且難以避免的,會在我們身邊造成極大地威脅,惟有提高危機意識,提前做好防範措施,才是將風險降至最低的不二法門.

投資人的態度和行為像鐘擺那樣擺動(霍華.馬克斯)

證券市場人氣的擺盪就像鐘擺運動。

雖然弧線的中點最能描述鐘擺的”平均”位置，實際上它待在那邊的時間很少。相反的，它幾乎總是擺向弧線的極端，或者從極端擺回來。但是每當鐘擺接近任何一個極端，都不可避免遲早將擺向中點。事實上，擺向極端的運動本身，供應了擺回來所需的能量。

投資市場也像鐘擺那樣，在下面的事情之間擺動，

(1)   與奮和沮喪。

(2)   歡欣鼓舞慶祝正面的發展和心裡只想著負面的發展。

(3)   價格過高和價格過低。

The most important thing (Howard Marks)－投資要注意循環

我認為，一定要記住幾乎每樣東西都有循環。我能夠確定事情不多，但下面說的這些事情是真的：循環最後總是占上風。沒有一件事物是永遠往一個方向走的。樹木不會高聳入雲。極少東西會跌到一文不值。堅持用今天發生的事預測未來，幾乎比任何事都更危及投資人的財富。

投資－控制風險

優良的建設公司能夠避免建築缺陷，而不好的建設公司留下建築缺陷。地震沒來時，無法判斷其中的差異。

市場穩定或上漲時，我們當然無法看出一個投資組合承受著多高的風險。這就是巴菲特所說的，除非潮水退去，否則無法判斷那些泳客有穿衣服，那些泳客沒穿。

確認投資機會(霍華.馬克斯)

最重要的學科不是會計或經濟，而是心理。

現在誰喜歡，以及誰不喜歡這項投資，才是關鍵。未來的價格波動，將由它會被更多人喜歡，或者被較少人喜歡所決定。

投資是一種人氣競賽，最危險的是在人氣鼎沸時買進。在那一點，所有有利的事實和意見，都已經反映在它的價格上，而且找不到等待進場的新買盤。

最安全和潛在獲利最高的作法，在沒人喜歡的時候買進某樣東西，假以時日，它的人氣，以及它的價格，只有一條路好走：上漲

智慧型投票投資人 (班傑明.葛拉漢)

智慧型投票投資人 (班傑明.葛拉漢)

投資這門藝術有個特性，不是普遍為人所知。投資生手只要投入一點點的努力和展現一點點的能力，也能得到不錯，甚至十分突出的成果；但是得來容易的成果想要更上一層樓，則需要非常努力，也不能只運用一丁點的智慧。

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1994 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1994 年巴菲特致股東信)

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary-appearing businesses. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as “getting paid for home runs other fellows hit.” That’s may formula at Berkshire, also.

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1988 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1988 年巴菲特致股東信)

In fact, when we own portions of outstanding businesses with outstanding managements our favorite holding period is forever: We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on to businesses that disappoint. Peter Lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds.

We continue to concentrate our investments in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful to businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way.

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1987 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1987 年巴菲特致股東信)

The Fortune study I mentioned earlier supports our view. Only 25 of the 1,000 companies met two tests of economic excellence-an average return on equity of over 20% in the ten years, 1977 through 1986, and no year worse than 15%. These business superstars were also stock market superstars: During the decade, 24 of the 25 outperformed the S&P 500.

The Fortune champs may surprise you in two respects. First, most use very little leverage compared to their interest-paying capacity. Really good businesses usually don’t need to borrow. Second, except for one company that is “high-tech” and several others that manufacture ethical drugs, the companies are in businesses that, on balance, seem rather mundane. Most sell non-sexy products or services in much the same manner as they did ten years ago (though in larger quantities now, or at higher prices, or both). The record of these 25 companies confirms that marking the most of an already strong business franchise, or concentrating on a single winning business theme, is what usually produces exceptional economics.

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1983 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1983 年巴菲特致股東信)

You should be fully aware of one attitude Charlie and I share that hurts our financial performance: regardless of price, we have no interest at all in selling any good businesses that Berkshire owns, and are very reluctant to sell sub-pa businesses as long as we expect then to generate at least some cash and as long as we feel good about their managers and labor relations. We hope not to repeat the capital-allocation mistakes that led us into such sub-par businesses. And we react with great caution to suggestions that our poor businesses can be restored to satisfactory profitability by major capital expenditures. (The projections will be sizzling- the advocates will be sincere – but, in the end, major additional investment in a terrible industry usually is about as rewarding as struggling in quicksand.) Nevertheless, gin rummy managerial behavior (discard your least promising business at each turn) is not our style. We would rather have our overall results penalized a bit than engage in it.

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1982 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1982 年巴菲特致股東信)

For the investor, a too-high purchase price for the stock of an excellent company can undo the effects of a subsequent decade of favorable business developments.

Should the stock market advance to considerably higher levels, our ability to utilize capital effectively in partial-ownership positions will be reduced or eliminated.

This will happen periodically: just ten years ago, at the height of the two-tier market mania (with high-return-on-equity businesses bid to sky by institutional investors), Berkshire’s insurance subsidiaries owned only $18 million in market value of equities, excluding their interest in Blue Chip Stamps. At that time, such equity holdings amounted to about 15% of our insurance company investments versus the present 80%. There were as many good businesses around in 1972 as in 1982, but the prices the stock market placed upon those businesses in 1972 looked absurd. While high stock prices in the future would make our performance look good temporarily, they would hurt our long-term business prospects rather than help them. We currently are seeing early traces of this problem.

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1985 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders (1985 年巴菲特致股東信)

You might think that institutions, with their large staffs of highly-paid and experienced investment professionals, would be a force for stability and reason in financial markets. They are not: stocks heavily owned and constantly monitored by institutions have often been among the most inappropriately valued.

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders (1981 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders (1981 年巴菲特致股東信)

Currently, we find values most easily obtained through the open-market purchase of fractional positions in companies with excellent business franchises and competent, honest managements. We never expect to run these companies, but we do expect to profit from them.

We expect that undistributed earnings from such companies will produce full value (subject to tax when realized) for Berkshire and its shareholders. If they don’t, we have made mistakes as to either:

(1)   the management we have elected to join;

(2)   the future economics of the business;

(3)   the price we have paid.

We have made plenty of such mistakes-both in the purchase of non-controlling and controlling interests in businesses. Category (2) miscalculations are the most common. Of course, it is necessary to dig deep into our history to find illustrations of such mistakes-sometimes as deep as two or three months back. For example, last year your Chairman volunteered his expert opinion on the rosy future of the aluminum business. Several minor adjustments to that opinion-now aggregating approximately 180 degrees-have since been required.

For personal as well as more objective reasons, however, we generally have been able to correct such mistakes far more quickly in the case of non-controlled businesses (marketable securities) than in the case of controlled subsidiaries.

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, (1980 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, (1980 年巴菲特致股東信)

If a fine business is selling in the market place for far less than intrinsic value, what more certain or more profitable utilization of capital can there be than significant enlargement of the interests of all owners at that bargain price? The competitive nature of corporate acquisition activity almost guarantees the payment of a full-frequently more than full price when a company buys the entire ownership of another enterprise. But the auction nature of security market often allows finely-run companies the opportunity to purchase portions of their own business at a price under 50% of that needed to acquire the same earning power through the negotiated acquisition of another enterprise.

You can’t be all things to all men, Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, (1979 年巴菲特致股東信)

You can’t be all things to all men, Warrant Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders, (1979 年巴菲特致股東信)

In large part, companies obtain the shareholder constituency that they seek and deserve. If they focus their thinking and communications on short-term results or short-term stock market consequences they will, in large part, attract shareholders who focus on the same factors. And if they are cynical in their treatment of investors, eventually that cynicism is highly likely to be returned by the investment community.

Phil Fisher, a respected investor and author, once likened the policies of the corporation in attracting shareholders to those of a restaurant attracting potential customers. A restaurant could seek a given clientele-patrons of fast foods, elegant dining, oriental food, etc.-and eventually obtain an appropriate group of devotees. If the job were expertly done, that clientele, pleased with the service, menu, and price level offered, would return consistently. But the restaurant could not change its character constantly and end up with a happy and stable clientele. If the business vacillated between French cuisine and takeout chicken, the result would be a revolving door of confused and dissatisfied customers.

So it is with corporations and the shareholder constituency they seek. You can’t be all things to all men, simultaneously seeking different owners whose primary interests run from high current yield to long-term capital growth to stock market pyrotechnics, etc.

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, (1978 年巴菲特致股東信)

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders, (1978 年巴菲特致股東信)

We are not concerned with whether the market quickly revalues upward securities that we believe are selling at bargain prices. In fact, we prefer just the opposite since, in most years, we expect to have funds available to be a net buyer of securities. And consistent attractive purchasing is likely to prove to be of more eventual benefit to us than any selling opportunities provided by a short-term run up in stock prices to levels at which we are unwilling to continue buying.

Warren Buffett's Letter to Shareholders (1977年巴菲特致股東信)

Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day.

Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stock.

Warren Buffett's View, 避開只有價格, 沒有價值的公司

But, like Cinderella at the ball, you must heed one warning or everything will turn into pumpkins and mice: Mr. Market is there to serve you, not to guide you. It is his pocketbook, not his wisdom, that you will find useful. If he shows up some day in a particularly foolish mood, you are free to either ignore him or to take advantage of him, but it will be disastrous if you fall under his influence. Indeed, if you aren’t certain that you understand and can value your business far better than Mr. Market, you don’t belong in the game. As they say in poker, “If you’ve been in the game 30 minutes and you don’t know who the patsy is, you’re the patsy.”

Outstanding business with outstanding managements (Buffett’s Letter to Shareholders, 1989 年巴菲特致股東信)

In Fact, when we won portions of outstanding business with outstanding managements, our favorite holding period is forever.  We are just the opposite of those who hurry to sell and book profits when companies perform well but who tenaciously hang on the businesses that disappoint. Peter lynch aptly likens such behavior to cutting the flowers and watering the weeds.

We continue to concentrate our investment in a very few companies that we try to understand well. There are only a handful of businesses about which we have strong long-term convictions. Therefore, when we find such a business, we want to participate in a meaningful way.

The Rip Van Winkle Style of Investing (1989 年巴菲特致股東信)

 Because of the way the tax law works, the Rip Van Winkle style of investing that we favor-if successful-had an important mathematical edge over a more frenzied approach. Let’s look at an extreme comparison.

Imagine that Berkshires had only $1, which we put in a security that double by yearend and was then sold. Imagine further that we used the after-tax proceeds t repeat this process in each of the next 19 years, scoring a double each time. At the end of 20 years, the 34% capital gains tax that we would have paid on the profits from each sale would have delivered about $13,000 to the government and we would be left with about $25,250. Not bad. If , however, we made a single fantastic investment that itself doubled 20 times during the 20 years, our dollar would grow to $1,048,576. Were we then to cash out, we would pay a 34% tax of roughly $356,500 and be left with about $692,000.

We have not, we should stress, adopted our strategy favoring long-term investment commitments because of these mathematics.

華倫巴菲特, 致股東的信, 1994

We achieved our gains through the efforts of a superb corps of operating managers who get extraordinary results from some ordinary operating business. Casey Stengel described managing a baseball team as “getting paid for home runs other follows hit. “That’s my formula at Berkshire, also

1994 Warren E. Buffett